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As discussed in Chapter 1, the collective bargaining system in the
United States is embedded in a belief system that gives great weight to
individualism in employment, property rights, and employment solely
as a creator of economic value. As compared with the industrial
democracies of Europe, the employment relationship is viewed as hav-
ing very little social content. Whereas in Europe, collectivization of
employment as a means of equalizing the influence of employer and
employee is the norm, in the United States the norm is an employment
relationship between the employer and the individual employee that is
based on the economic value each derives from the relationship. Col-
lectivization of employment in the United States does occur but it is
not the norm. In 2001, only about 9.7 percent of private-sector employ-
ees were covered by collective bargaining agreements (U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics 2002). 
Thus, examining Chapter 2, on the legal, institutional, and eco-
nomic contexts for collective bargaining, employment protection/cre-
ation, and competitiveness, it is not surprising that no actor, institution,
or subsystem in the United States encourages the collective bargaining
system to be used for those—or any—purposes. Public policy toward
employment and collective bargaining, which reflects the individualis-
tic, transactional belief system discussed in Chapter 1, is the most
important single influence on the nature of collective bargaining in the
United States. With no commitment to a collective bargaining system,
public policy neither encourages nor discourages collective bargaining
as a method of establishing terms and conditions of employment.
Rather, public policy is designed to protect the choice of employees as
to whether they wish to be represented by a union/labor organization
for the purposes of collective bargaining. Employees make these
choices individually, in the privacy of the representation election vot-
ing booth. These choices are made on the basis of individual bargain-
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ing units, which are legally required to be the employer, plant/facility,
or subdivision thereof. In other words, even where employees choose
to collectivize, the scope of the collectivity is often quite narrow.
Consistent with the property rights orientation of employment,
employers have substantial flexibility in addressing competitiveness
through employment system. The unit-by-unit unionization system
means that there is no necessary relationship regarding unionization in
firm facilities. Thus, it is not unusual for employers to have both union-
ized and non-union facilities, and to have multiple unions representing
employees in the unionized facilities. It may be difficult for unions in
different facilities to work together, and it is often very difficult for
unions to organize facilities not currently organized (Block, Beck, and
Kruger 1996). Employers, through their property rights, have competi-
tiveness options that exclude a union, where one exists, and/or incorpo-
rate the potential to require unions to internally compete with one
another. The collective bargaining system will be so used to encourage
competitiveness and job security/protection only if both parties wish it.
If only one party resists, it won’t happen. Put differently, labor law
simply enables collective bargaining to be used for competitiveness
and job security; it does not require or even encourage it to be used for
that purpose. 
As noted, there is no presumption in U.S. public policy that collec-
tive bargaining is a “normal” process of establishing terms and condi-
tions of employment. Rather, “normal” is unilateral employer
determination. The underlying assumption is that collective bargaining
impairs the ability of firms to compete.1 A large literature has devel-
oped to examine this assumption, and this literature was reviewed in
Chapter 3. The discussion in that chapter observed that unions and col-
lective bargaining are more frequently associated with higher produc-
tivity and lower production costs than they are with lower productivity
and higher production costs, but that unions are associated with
reduced profits. There is no evidence that collective bargaining is asso-
ciated with reduced investment, but there is some evidence that collec-
tive bargaining is associated with reduced firm survival. There is no
evidence that unionization is also associated with a greater rate of
worker displacement among union members. There is some evidence
that collective bargaining innovations, such as labor–management
cooperation, have a positive effect on product quality, but the effect of
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collective bargaining innovations on other measures such as productiv-
ity, job security, and training was minimal. Finally, focusing on
employment, where there were employment gains, unionized gains
were lower; where there were employment losses, unionized losses
were greater.
This research suggests the powerful orientation in the United
States toward property rights and the support of labor markets that are
permitted to operate under a transaction assumption with little govern-
mental involvement or employee protection. Under such a system,
unionism and collective bargaining must compete with non-union
employment systems that are closely aligned with the market assump-
tions of the United States labor market. Thus, it is not surprising that
unions may have some negative employment effects, as firms, using
their property rights, are likely to be tempted to invest less in unionized
facilities than in non-union facilities. 
Overall, it appears that much of the presumed impact of unionism
and collective bargaining on firm performance is not borne out by the
research. The effects of unionism are far more complex than would be
believed based on economic theories. This chapter will return to this
theme.
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, EMPLOYMENT, AND FIRM 
PERFORMANCE: PLANT- AND FIRM-LEVEL 
PERSPECTIVES
Unlike Chapter 1, which examined collective bargaining at a sys-
temic level, and Chapters 2 and 3, which provided an economy-level
perspective on collective bargaining, Chapters 5–8 took a micro view
by presenting four case studies of the relationship between collective
bargaining, job protection/creation, and firm competitiveness. As dis-
cussed in the methodology chapter, Chapter 4, the case studies repre-
sented a range of products, production processes, and market
constraints. The four sites studied were Alcoa–Rockdale, Texas, and
United Steelworkers of America Local 4895; General Motors–Lansing,
Michigan, and UAW Local 652; Lear–Elsie, Michigan, and UAW
Local 1660; and Sparrow Health Care Systems, Lansing, Michigan,
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and the Michigan Nurses Association. Three were manufacturing sites,
and one was a health care service sector site. This section will summa-
rize common themes across all four case studies by examining market
issues common to all the cases and differences in how the market
affected each firm. The chapter will then summarize the collective bar-
gaining response and provide a brief conclusion.
Market Factors
The employment relationship in the United States is based on value
created for the employer. Value in this context is determined primarily
by the product market for the good or service produced by the
employee. Thus, it is not surprising that a common theme across all the
case studies is the importance of the product market as the driver of the
collective bargaining relationship. As there are few societally created
legislative buffers to insulate the parties from the effects of the product
market, the parties in each relationship were required to adjust to the
forces affecting the product market for the goods or services produced
by the employer and by the workers. In the Alcoa–USW and GM/Lan-
sing–UAW cases, the market forces were direct globalization and
increased competition. For the Lear–UAW case, globalization was a
level removed, but the cost and quality pressures that the globalized
auto industry placed on Lear’s customers, the auto manufacturers, were
the direct cause of pressure on Lear. In the Sparrow–MNA case, the
market pressure came from managed care and the pressure from payers
to reduce their insurance outlays. This pressure has caused Sparrow to
develop a broad-based strategy of diversification from inpatient care.
In the Alcoa case, the main change in the economic environment
was the globalization of the market for aluminum. Whereas for much
of the twentieth century Alcoa had been the dominant firm in the alu-
minum market, able to sets its prices based on cost, this was no longer
the case by the late 1980s. The emergence of the London Metal
Exchange in the early 1980s, combined with the increased world sup-
ply of aluminum, meant that Alcoa was subject to world demand and
supply pressures. 
Globalization of the market, albeit for automobiles, also affected
GM–Lansing and the UAW. It caused GM to lose market share, with a
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subsequent reorganization that placed plants in competition for product
allocation.
Globalization has also encouraged the auto companies to outsource
(subcontract) more of their parts work in an effort to reduce costs. This
outsourcing was both a threat and an opportunity to a supplier like
Lear. While it provided Lear with the opportunity to grow the business,
as indicated by employment growth in the industry, the small number
of potential purchases and the large size of the purchase also placed
extreme cost pressures on Lear in order to obtain that business and to
make that business profitable. Sparrow and the Michigan Nurses Asso-
ciation have been required to respond to pressures from the major
health care payers and changes in the structure of the health care indus-
try.
Firm-Level Variation
Property rights and the absence of aggregating structures permit
firms to create their own responses to market pressures. Thus, the
increased market pressure on these relationships had different effects,
depending on the firm response. For Alcoa–Rockdale and the USW,
the major impact was an increased saliency of the plant’s energy cost
disadvantage due to its use of coal, forcing the union to reduce labor
costs to offset the plant’s energy cost disadvantage. For GM–Lansing
and UAW Local 652, these pressures manifested themselves in a reor-
ganization by GM. This reorganization forced the Lansing production
facilities into the GM allocation system. Thus, the new goal was to
encourage GM to allocate the product to Lansing. For Lear, the market
pressure is coming from their customers. The market for seat assem-
blies, while potentially large, is characterized by a small number of
potential buyers, namely, those firms in the auto assembly business.
The loss of one contract can have a substantial effect on employment.
Management and the union must be constantly attentive to this small,
identifiable group of customers.
For Sparrow and the MNA, the market pressures are constant.
They emanate from the true payers for most health care in the United
States, the insurance companies and the government. This cost pres-
sure is placing increased pressure on the traditional resident care busi-
ness while causing Sparrow to move into tertiary areas, such as
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outpatient clinics and labs. From a business 20 years ago in which
demand was determined by physicians and somebody else paid the
bills, Sparrow and the MNA find themselves in a cost-conscious world
with a few large buyers.
Collective Bargaining
Despite these differences, all the parties have maintained the tradi-
tional written collective bargaining agreement. This structured, legalis-
tic, formal agreement of fixed duration, which explicates the terms and
conditions of employment and the rights and obligations of both parties
and is enforced by a grievance procedure ending in a final and binding
arbitration decision, is the basis of the U.S. system of industrial rela-
tions. It is the bedrock on which all of these relationships are based. 
At the same time, recognizing the importance of market forces to
value-based employment, the parties in these relationships have estab-
lished joint, extracontractual structures to permit flexibility, with the
purpose of maintaining or improving the competitiveness of the facility
as the source of maximizing employment. The partnership teams at
Alcoa–Rockdale, the “star system” at GM–Lansing, the joint steering
teams and planning teams at Lear–Elsie, and the Mutual Gains Com-
mittee at Sparrow all represent extracontractual joint activities that
were deemed by the parties to be consistent with the collective agree-
ment. It is important to point out, however, that involvement in these
joint activities normally represented a willingness by management to
cede its rights under the formal collective agreement to make decisions
on such matters as how the product or service was produced. It also
meant that the union was, for all practical purposes, giving up its right
to grieve management decisions, since the decisions made by these
extracontractual structures were, in fact, joint decisions rather than
management decisions.
Case Study Conclusions
The four case studies presented provide concrete examples of how
collective bargaining in the United States can be a vehicle for creating
firm competitiveness and employment protection and creation. Despite
the variation in the sources of market pressure on these relationships,
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the parties in all four relationships have developed joint methods of
operating. While each structure is specific to the parties’ relationship, a
common characteristic is a willingness of the firm and the union to put
aside their contractual rights and engage in a joint, extracontractual
process for competitiveness purposes. Competitiveness, in this context,
means success in the product market. Value-based employment
requires such success.
Of the four sites, only GM–Lansing and the UAW operate in an
environment of some administered job security, through the JOBS pro-
gram in the GM–UAW national agreement that covers the members of
Local 652 and the Lansing site. The JOBS program, however, is
designed to prevent layoffs or job reductions associated with increas-
ing productive efficiency, so as to create incentives for GM and the
UAW to work jointly to increase competitiveness. It is not a job guar-
antee in that it does not operate in the event of a volume decline due to
market-related conditions. Thus, overall, it is accurate to say that job
security in the United States is market-based rather than administered.
Consistent with the principle of value-based employment, these four
cases have accepted that principle and work within in it.
Given the importance of property rights in the United States, one
would expect substantial variation in the structures of these systems,
and that is what is seen. The GM–Lansing system is the most formal,
with multiple functions reporting to a union joint activities coordinator.
Given the size and geographic scope of the GM–Lansing system, this
would be expected. Lear and UAW Local 1660 organized its structure,
the joint steering team, by function. Sparrow and the Michigan Nurses
Association organized the Mutual Gains Committee by the patient care
system. Alcoa–Rockdale and the Steelworkers created a structure that
was organized by department within a single facility producing alumi-
num.
These case studies support the conclusions from the review of the
literature. Collective bargaining, broadly defined to include not only
the formal collective agreement but also joint extracontractual struc-
tures, can be a vehicle for both competitiveness and employment pro-
tection in the United States. The collective bargaining system in the
United States works within the constraints of property-rights-based,
value-based employment. Collective bargaining has been successful in
promoting these twin goals where the bargaining system has respected
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the unique characteristics of the production process and the parties to
each collective bargaining relationship. 
CONCLUSION
Taken together, the overview sections and the case studies rein-
force several important themes. First, due to a large extent to the influ-
ence of employer property rights, there is wide variation in industrial
relations in the United States. This has been documented elsewhere
(Block, Beck, and Kruger 1996), and it was reinforced by the case
studies here, with the range of options they implemented.
The second important theme is the importance of market-based job
security in the United States. The principle of value-based employment
means job security comes not from administrative rules in collective
bargaining agreements, but from the market success of the firm. 
The third important theme is the essential decentralization of col-
lective bargaining in the United States. This is the result of property
rights, unit-by-unit bargaining, and local union autonomy.
Fourth, business unionism, as discussed by Perlman ([1928], 1966)
has reasserted itself in the United States. There is a narrow local union
focus on job security of its members, the incumbents. Given the impor-
tance of the job to the worker, it can be argued that principles of union
democracy and local union autonomy require a focus on incumbents. 
Fifth, and related to the third point above, even in a labor market as
strong as that of the United States in the late 1990s, job security is par-
amount. This demonstrates the importance of the seniority system
incorporated in the vast majority of collective bargaining agreements
and the continuing existence of a union wage premium, at least for the
workers at these sites.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The five themes discussed above can be collapsed into two major
points that could inform a policy debate regarding the role of collective
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bargaining in encouraging firm competitiveness and employment pro-
tection creation. The first major point is derived from the discussion in
Chapter 2 of the institutional framework under which collective bar-
gaining addresses issues of competitiveness and job protection/cre-
ation. The second major point is derived from the research on
collective bargaining and competitiveness discussed in Chapter 3, and
the case studies in Chapters 5–8.
In regard to the institutional framework, public policy views col-
lective bargaining in an employee choice framework, indifferent as to
whether there is a strong collective bargaining system. Policy also has
little to say about collective bargaining, competitiveness, and employ-
ment protection/creation. This follows quite logically from the transac-
tion view of employment. Employment in the United States is a
voluntary economic transaction between two individuals with minimal
social content. The terms and conditions of employment should be sub-
ject to only a minimum of government regulation. 
The literature review in Chapter 3 and the case studies in Chapters
5–8 provide a basis for rethinking this view. The literature review in
Chapter 3 has shown that research has demonstrated that collective
bargaining and firm competitiveness are compatible. Thus, employees
can fully participate in their work lives through independent represen-
tation, and have industrial democracy, while at the same time encour-
aging competitiveness in the firms in which they work. The case
studies in Chapters 5–8 provided examples of how this compatibility is
manifested at the firm or plant level.
Therefore, it may be time for policymakers to rethink the current
indifference to collective bargaining as a vehicle for competitiveness,
and employment protection/creation, and develop policies that would
encourage it. Such policy changes would likely have the advantage of
reducing the social costs of unemployment and the disruption associ-
ated with the many changes firms must undergo to remain competitive.
Employees often have the largest stake in a firm’s competitiveness,
especially those at the lowest education levels who are the least mobile.
What are possible policy changes? First, the National Labor Rela-
tions Act should be amended to make all firm decisions that affect
employment, even those that involve a change in the basic nature of the
business, subject to collective bargaining. One never knows what sug-
gestions employees will have unless they are given a chance, through
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their union, to make them. There is no obligation on either side to
agree, but what is lost by forcing the parties to bargain about these mat-
ters? In addition, making all such decisions negotiable will bring cer-
tainty to the law, and will reduce the incentive to litigate over whether
a matter should be the subject of negotiations.
Second, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) should con-
sider a broader conceptualization of the notion of bargaining unit
accretion to permit collective bargaining to be a more viable option
than it currently is in questions of intrafirm allocation of resources. For
firms with a large number of unionized facilities, the law should
decrease the barriers to including in one of those bargaining units a
non-union facility that produces a product similar to a proximate and
similar unionized facility. Currently, the NLRB permits accretion of a
new or acquired facility to an existing bargaining unit based on a con-
sideration of such factors as 1) the degree of interchange of employees
among facilities; 2) geographical proximity; 3) integration of opera-
tions, machinery, and product lines; 4) centralization of administrative
and labor relations control; 5) similarity of working conditions, skills,
and job duties; and 6) the number of employees (Harden and Higgins
2001). By giving greater weight to criteria such as product similarity
and job duties, and less weight to criteria such as employee interchange
and common labor relations control, and by considering proximity less
as a criterion for accretion per se and more as a criterion for identifying
the host unit, collective bargaining as a vehicle for encouraging firm
competitiveness and job security can be strengthened.
Third, Congress should create a permanent labor–management
committee to advise it on issues of firm competitiveness and employ-
ment protection/creation. Such a committee would not replace the cur-
rent partisan advocacy through such organizations as the Chamber of
Commerce, National Association of Manufacturers, Labor Policy
Association, and the AFL-CIO. It would, however, add a new voice to
the mix. It would also be a vehicle for labor and management, at a high
level, to find common ground. Such a committee would be a mere
shadow of the social partnership notion prevalent in Europe, but it
would establish the principle of the importance of creating and aggre-
gating labor–management organizations.
These proposals are modest attempts to increase the status of col-
lective bargaining as a tool for encouraging firm competitiveness and
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job protection/creation. The proposal on expanding the subject matter
of bargaining does not change the substantive obligations encompassed
in the duty to bargain. The proposal on non-union facilities, while
novel, is nothing more than a modification of an established NLRB
principle, unit accretion. The proposal on a labor–management com-
mittee places no requirement on the committee; rather, it establishes
the principle that one should exist. These proposals could be imple-
mented with minimal disruption to the current collective bargaining
system in the United States.
Equally important, based on the work shown here, there is no
inconsistency between collective bargaining and firm health. Enhanc-
ing employee rights in the context of collective bargaining, and sup-
porting collective bargaining, can be obtained at little if any cost to
firm competitiveness. In other words, the price of industrial democracy
may be much lower than is generally believed.
FINAL OBSERVATIONS 
Overall, the work in this book demonstrates that collective bar-
gaining, job protection/creation, and firm competitiveness are compati-
ble in the United States. Employees can enjoy the rights and
protections inherent in collective bargaining, and shareholders and
other firm stakeholders can prosper. This research has shown that the
established view that these are incompatible is at best an oversimplifi-
cation based on extremely lean economic theories that do not take into
account the complexity and flexibility of “real world” employment. At
worst, this is a view based on values, ideology, and unstated assump-
tions. Policymakers concerned about collective bargaining, firm com-
petitiveness, and job protection/creation should understand this as they
consider policies in these areas. 
Note
1. An example of this assumption can be found in Schiller (2002).
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